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Purpose of this paper is to analyze the convergence of the consumption structure, both at 
the empirical and the theoretical levels. The basic empirical result is that the consumption 
structure converges quite quickly. We feel that the income effect is not sufficient to explain 
this high speed. That is why we introduce some post-Keynesian motives of consumer 
behaviour. We present a model of the dynamics of consumption structure and describe 
different simulation experiments with this model. These experiments are based on the actual 
data about consumers in the Czech Republic and in Germany (in fact, we approximate by 
German consumers the old EU members’ consumers). The results of simulations show that 
the behavior of the model really leads to the convergence of the consumption structure in the 
Czech Republic and the old EU members, so the post-Keynesian motives of consumer 
behavior are among possible explanations of the empirical fact of convergence. 
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  21. Introduction 
Purpose of this paper is to analyse the convergence of the consumption structure, both at 
the empirical and the theoretical levels.  
For the convergence of consumption patterns, a couple of theoretical explanations can be 
used. Our paper is based on the processes described by the post-Keynesian theory of the 
consumer choice. This theory does not assume perfect information and perfect rationality 
based on mathematical optimization as the mainstream economic theory does. It starts with 
the fact of the existence of the so-called fundamental uncertainty: in reality it is usually 
impossible to assign probability to possible outcomes. This leads to the so-called procedural 
rationality: some behavior is rational if we can logically explain it, be it by imitation of self - 
behaviour in the past or behavior of some reference group. 
After establishing the empirical fact of convergence, the post-Keynesian motives of 
consumer behavior are specified. Thereafter, a model of the dynamics of consumption 
structure is presented and simulation experiments with this model are described. These 
experiments are based on actual data about consumers in the Czech Republic and in Germany 
(in fact, we approximate by German consumers the old EU members consumers). 
 
2.  Does the Consumption Structure Really Converge? 
Let us look at three figures based on the Eurostat and OECD data sources
2.  
In Figure 1, the development of consumption expenditures for different categories of 
goods and services in the new EU members from 1995 to 2003 is demonstrated. Except of the 
expenditures for food and non-alcoholic beverages, no many clear trends can be 
distinguished. 
For each year, we calculated for each consumption category the variance of percentage 
shares of consumption, both for the group of old and the group of new EU members. We used 
the sum of variances across all consumption categories as our measure of convergence of 
consumption structure. The result is in Figure 2,  the convergence of consumption structure is 
clearly visible. Figure 2 is based on Eurostat data – Consumption Expenditures of Private 
Households. 
In Figure 3, we touch the question of the long – run stability of the consumption 
structure. Based on a mix of OECD
3 and Eurostat data, it seems that once the consumption 
structure has converged, it stays relatively stable, as it is the case for the old EU members for 
the years 1980, 1990 and 2000
4. 
The convergence is quite quick, about two thirds of the gap between the old and new EU 
members were closed in 8 years. 
                                                           
2 On samba.fsv.cuni.cz/~cahlik/Articles' Support an Excel file with all the data and calculations can be 
found. 
3 OECD Environmental Data, COMPENDIUM 2002, General data, OECD Environment Directorate. 
4 We do not work with the full set of countries here, because of the lack of data. Nevertheless, in our 
opinion, the results are quite robust. Different sets of countries explain slight differences in results 
between Figures 2 and 3.  
  3Figure 1   Development of Consumption Expenditures in New EU Members  
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Figure 2   Convergence from 1995 to 2003 
 
 
Figure 3   Long – Run Stability of Consumption Structure in the Old EU  
Members 
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3.  Post - Keynesian Motives of Consumer Behavior 
In contrast with the mainstream neoclassical theories of consumer behavior, in the post-
Keynesian approach to consumption, outlays for different goods are determined by social and 
psychological motives. 
In our model we assume four different motives of consumer choice
5: 
1.  Autocorrelation 
Consumer choice depends on consumption in preceding period. 
2.  Positive social correlation 
Consumers imitate the consumption behavior of other consumers, both in the same 
employees group and the same income group, where the social contacts are supposed to be 
mostly during their leisure time.  
3.  Negative social correlation 
Consumers want to differ from consumers in lower income groups. In our model, we take 
into account just the consumption pattern in the nearest lower income group6. 
4.  Aspiration towards higher social groups 
Consumers want to show the same consumption pattern as consumers in higher income 
groups. In our model, we take into account just the consumption pattern in the nearest higher 
income group.
7 
For each consumer all motives are differently weighted and based on this we get his or 
her final consumption structured among all types of consumption. 
 
4.  Model of the Dynamics of Consumption Structure
8 
Model analyses the structure of consumption we get from the decision making of single 
consumers dividing their income among different types of consumption according to the 
motives described above. 
Income is based on outlays for consumer goods in preceding period. We have a closed 
cycle in which consumers pay in sectors – industrial branches - producing different types of 
goods. Their payments are then divided among employees, after taking away taxes
9. The 
share of each employee depends on the preceding structure of employees’ incomes. The role 
of the state is just the reallocation of tax income among employees in the form of social 
transfers. The share of transfers of each employee depends again on preceding income
10. 
What the employees get they spend in the next period for different types of consumer goods
11. 
                                                           
5   The theoretical background is here the concept of procedural rationality. 
6   Even if we take into account just the nearest groups, after a sufficient number of periods the change of 
consumption behavior of each income group impacts all other income groups. 
7   This motive is the key motive for the modeling of the convergence of the consumption pattern in the 
CR towards the consumption pattern in the EU. From the point of view of Czech consumers, 
consumers in the EU are in the highest income group. 
8   Can be found on http://instituty.fsv.cuni.cz/~honzak/eu/. 
9   We use a unique tax rate for all income groups. From simulation experiments with the model we have 
learned that the introduction of taxing into the model slows down the convergence of the model. A 
progressive tax rate would further strengthen this feature. 
10  Health care and education are assumed to be financed privately in our model. The performance of the 
model would not change much if we allowed public financing from taxes. 
11  We do not model savings in our model. 
  6So each individual plays both the role of an employee in an industrial branch and a consumer. 
The structure of the model is in Figure 4. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model runs in closed cycles – periods. The basic information we get from each cycle is: 
•  the structure of consumption in the cycle according to different types of consumption, 
•  the income of each employee he or she will spend in the next cycle as a consumer and  
•  the shifts of employees – consumers among different income groups.  
 
In each period, following steps are done: 
1.  The actual income of each consumer is divided among all types of consumption. The 
outlay for each type of consumption depends on following outlays in the preceding 
period, each outlay weighted by an exogenously given weight (w0,..,w5 ): 
•  own outlay (weight w0) 
•  average outlay of the same income group (weight w1) 
•  average outlay of the same employee group (weight w2) 
•  average outlay of all consumers (weight w3) 
•  average outlay of the nearest lower income group (for all but the lowest income group) 
(weight –w4) 
•  average outlay of the nearest higher income group (for all but the highest income 
group) (weight w5).  
  7 
2.  Total outlays for all consumption types are calculated – these outlays are equal to total 
incomes of relevant employee branches.  
3.  For each branch, we decrease the total income by taxes
12 and distribute the rest among 
employees – (consumers in the next period) based on their previous incomes
13. 
4.  We redistribute among employees – consumers the tax income in the form of government 
transfers; based on their income group in the preceding period and two exogenous 
parameters - number of recipient groups and the progression of transfers
14. 
5.  We divide employees – consumers among income groups. 
 
Simplifying assumptions of the model are:  
•  no shifts of employees among branches 
•  no financial sector. 
 
Farther simplifying assumptions we used in the simulation experiments described below 
are: 
•  no savings 
•  no economic growth 
•  no GDP shocks.  
 
5.  Data and Parameters Used for Simulation 
We set the length of one period to be one month. We work with 1000 employees – 
consumers, on the start of the program we distribute them equally among five income groups. 
Based on the Statistics of Family Accounts we calculate the original distribution of outlays for 
each consumption type of each income group. We add the highest income group, where the 
original distribution is calculated from the data for Germany
15. The original distributions are 
in Figure 5. 
                                                           
12  For a fixed tax rate, we can tax either on the branch level or on the individual’s level, it does not 
influence the result. 
13  In our model we have just one factor of production, so everything can be divided among wages. 
14  We assume just private consumption. All tax income of the government is transferred back to 
consumers. 
15 For the Czech Republic, the source of data is the Family Accounts Statistics published by the Czech 
Statistical Office (2001). The source of data for Germany is the statistics "Budget und Ausstattung 
Privater Haushalte", published by the "Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland" (2002). 
  8Figure 5  The original distributions of outlays 
 
 
Consumption structure in the EU differs especially in food and beverages, where the 
share of outlays in the EU is lower, it is evident that this share decreases with growing income 
in the Czech Republic as well. Considerable difference is in education, the outlays in the CR 
are just marginal. 
The average income per person in the CR is 10.000 CSK, starting employee’s income is 
calculated from the starting distribution of outlays among branches and from the distribution 
into income groups
16.  
Starting number of employees in each branch we calculate so as to get the same average 
wage in each branch. We assume that the distribution of employees into income groups is the 
same for all branches. 
We assume that the structure of consumption in the EU is constant during the 
convergence period. 
 
6.  Discussion of Simulation Results 
We set the default parameters of the model to: 
w0 = 0.5; w1 = 0.2; w2 = 0.2; w3 = 0.15; w4 = 0.1; w5 = 0.05. 
With these parameters, the most decisive motive for each consumer is his or her 
previous consumption (weight 50 %). Both the membership in an income group and in an 
employees group have the same influence on the consumption decision (weight 20 %). The 
weight with that the consumers take the decisions of all consumers into account is 15%. The 
negative social correlation has twice as high weight as the aspiration towards higher social 
group (10 % and 5 %). 
With these default parameters, the development of total incomes of sectors – industrial 
branches during the first 50 iterations is in Figure 6. 
                                                           
16 Employees from the first income group get 10,7 % of the branch income, the second 14,7 %, the third 
18,3 %, the fourth 23,2 % and the highest Czech 33.1 %. Based on the Family Accounts Statistics. In 
the same way are calculated the employees incomes in all periods. 
  9Figure 6  Development of total incomes of sectors – industrial branches 
 
We can see a clear tendency of decrease in expenditures on food and beverages and 
increase in expenditures on housing and education. In Figure 7 and Figure 8 we can see the 
development of expenditures for these consumption types for specific income groups. 
 
Figure 7 Decrease in expenditures on food and beverages 
 
  10 
Figure 8  Increase in expenditures on housing and energy 
 
It is evident that after a couple of periods, all income groups will converge toward the 
EU. In Figure 9 we can see that after 50 iterations, the structure of consumption in the fourth 
and fifth income groups is in principle identical to the structure in the EU and even the 
differences for the three lower income groups are not big. 
 
Figure 9  Final distribution of outlays 
 
 
So the model suggests, that the structure of consumption in the CR can approach the 
structure of consumption in the EU-15 in 50 periods (about 4 years). The convergence of the 
model with chosen parameters is completed approximately after 140 periods (about 12 years). 
  11To present this result in a similar way as in the empirical analysis of convergence, we 
use in Figure 10 the sum of variances as the measure of convergence. 
 




7. The impact of changes of the tax rate on the speed of convergence 
With the growth of the tax rate the differences among incomes diminish
17. Above the 
60% tax rate, the redistributional effect is so high that we get strong fluctuations in both 
incomes and expenditures. Bellow the 60% tax rate, we do not get any considerable impact of 
the tax rate changes on the speed of convergence. In Figure 11 and Figure 12 we can see the 
impact of the tax rate changes on expenditures in two industrial branches. 
                                                           
17  All tax income is redistributed as transfers. 
 




Figure 12  Impact of the tax rate change on expenditures on education 
 
In contradiction with the intuitive expectations, the growing tax rate makes the 
convergence of higher income groups slower even in the case in which the share of 
  13expenditures is originally higher than in the EU-15 and so the expenditures during the 
convergence diminish. This can be explained by the fact that the change of income is one of 
the factors of consumption and with growing tax rate the share of this change on the 
preceding income ceteris paribus decreases. The relative impact of this change on the 
consumption structure decreases as well. But this effect is again negligible for the tax rate 
bellow 60 %. 
Tax burden makes the convergence slower just in one phase of the convergence process, 
once the differences in expenditure shares diminish, farther motives, for example the negative 
social convergence gain and the described effect dies out. 
 
8.  Simulation experiments with other parameters 
We have performed a lot of simulation experiments with different parameters. Interested 
readers can perform different simulations themselves with the software realization of our 
model on the http://instituty.fsv.cuni.cz/~honzak/eu/ web page. 
The software model allows the user to enter different model parameters as e.g. number 
of simulated cycles, weights of individual consumer branch/group incomes, indirect tax, 
savings, taxes and transfers per income groups. Also modelling of the industrial branches 
growth, probabilities of shocks, their kind and duration is provided by the interactive model. 
All parameters are preset to reasonable values. Moreover, the user-friendly interface allows to 
set options dedicated to generating the results. It means that the user can check or uncheck 
individual tables and graphs options according to his or her wishes. The possibility to 
include/exclude individual courses and tables helps to arrange the results well. 
After performing the calculation results are displayed on an individual page. The top part 
of the page summarizes the entered model parameters and used abbreviations. Tables and 
graphs comprising expenditures on food and beverages, alcohol and tobacco, clothing and 
shoes, housing and energy, furniture, health, transportation, telecommunications, recreation 
and culture, education, lodging and food and "other goods" follow. The separation of results 
according to individual branches should allow the user to easily imagine the 
development/progression in individual branches. The progression of savings, size of groups 
and incomes is also included in the form of tables and graphs. Finally, the total growth of the 
model economy is summarized in a table and a graph together with disturbances. 
Our simulation experiments have been oriented to answer the basic question: Why do we 
get the convergence to the EU-15? The answer is quite clear, it is the aspiration motive 
towards higher income groups that makes the consumption structure in new member countries 
converge to  the old members. With w5 =0, we get the convergence for the five lower groups 
that are tied together with other motives as well. But the equilibrium is different than the 
equilibrium for the old members. We can show it for example for expenditures on food and 
beverages, see Figure 13. 
With w5 >0, we get the convergence towards the EU level even with all other weights set 
to zero. 
  14 




9.  Summary 
Based on empirical analysis, we have proved the fact of convergence of the consumption 
structure in the new EU members to the old EU members. The convergence to a relatively 
stable consumption structure seems to be quite quick – the most of the gap was closed in 8 
years. 
We feel that such a quick convergence cannot depend in the income effect only. That is 
why we have introduced a model for the analysis of the empirical fact of convergence of 
consumption structure in the Czech Republic towards the consumption structure in the 
European Union, based on post-Keynesian motives of consumer behavior. 
The basic result of simulations is that the behavior of the model leads to the convergence 
of the consumption structure in the Czech Republic to the old EU members, if we let the 
aspiration towards higher income groups work. Other motives of consumption and change of 
other parameters can speed up the convergence, but the aspiration motive is decisive.  
Farther elaboration of our experiments could go in the direction of analyses of impacts 
of the tax structure on the speed of convergence. We would expect that the increase of 
progression in taxes leads to higher speed of convergence in lower income groups and slows 
down the speed of convergence in higher income groups. 
And the model is prepared for simulations with different saving rates, growth rates and 
GDP shocks. 
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